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Family Background, Self-Confidence and Economic Outcomes
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In this paper we analyze the role played by self-confidence, modeled as beliefs about one’s 
ability, in shaping task choices. We propose a model in which fully rational agents exploit all 
the available information to update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule, eventually learning their 
true type. We show that when the learning process does not convergence quickly to the true 
ability level, even small differences in initial confidence can result in diverging patterns of 
human capital accumulation between otherwise identical individuals. As long as inital 
differences in the level of self-confidence are correlated with the socioeconomic background 
(as a large body of empirical evidence suggests), self-confidence turns out to be a channel 
through which education and earnings inequalities are transmitted across generations. Our 
theory suggests that cognitive tests should take place as early as possible, in order to avoid 
that systematic differences in self-confidence among equally talented people lead to the 
emergence of gaps in the accumulation of human capital. 
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Gaps in economic outcomes such as educational attainments and earnings tend to persist across
generations and it is well-known that the socio-economic status of the parents is usually a very
good predictor of the outcomes of their offspring.
Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne (2001) stress that “the advantages of the children of successful
parents go considerably beyond the beneﬁts of superior education, the inheritance of wealth,
or the genetic inheritance of cognitive ability.” They propose additional variables comparable
to what now goes under the label of “non-cognitive skills” as factors that can supplement the
ohterwise low explanatory power of the traditional variables used to ﬁt the variance of earn-
ings1. Moreover, they claim that the contribution of parental socio-economic status to earnings
is in part determined by such non-cognitive skills, genetically transmitted or learned from par-
ents that act as role models.
Since then many other authors have emphasized the role played by non-cognitive skills
in explaining economic success and gaps in attainments. The current literature on the eco-
nomic relevance of non-cognitive skills tends to treat these measures as inputs that enter the
“black-box” of the skill production function. Cunha and Heckman (2007) propose a particular
formulation of the technology of skill formation featuring self-productivity and dynamic com-
plementarities among a multidimensional vector of cognitive and non-cognitive skills. They
argue that insufﬁcient investment in some of these skills early in life has long-lasting conse-
quences that are very difﬁcult or costly to revert. Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006), Cunha
and Heckman (2007, 2008) and Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) have shown that gaps
between children from different backgrounds open up very early in life, as soon as in pre-school
age, and then tend to persist and stay roughly constant over the lifetime. Note how this ﬁnding
clearly locates the rising of the problem in a period in which the role of the parents is the most
important. Other recent papers that have focused on assessing the economic returns of differ-
ent types of inputs (cognitive vs. non-cognitive skills) include Heineck and Anger (2010) and
Lindqvist and Vestman (2011).
In this paper we want to analyze the role possibly played by a single non-cognitive skill,
namely self-conﬁdence, deﬁned as the beliefs over one’s unknown level of cognitive ability.
Hence, our model entails the simplest possible multidimensional vector of skills, containing
only two elements: a cognitive skill (innate ability) and a non-cognitive one (self-conﬁdence).
The use of such a framework is neither meant to deny the importance of other skills, nor the
well-established fact that cognitive and non-cognitive abilities are multidimensional in nature,
nor to downplay the signiﬁcance of the interaction among them. It simply reﬂects our goal to
1In general, non-cognitive skills are deﬁned as “personality traits that are weakly correlated with measures of
intelligence” (Brunello and Schlotter, 2011). In this broad concept economists have usually investigated the so-
called “Big Five” factors, following Nyhus and Pons (2005): agreeableness, conscentiousness, emotional stability,
extraversion and autonomy. Other commonly used measures include the locus of control (Caraloc) and the Lawseq
self-esteem score, but also attitudes toward risk and educational aspirations and expectations.
2isolate and highlight a very speciﬁc mechanism, i.e. the role that a wrong self-conﬁdence plays
through the distortion of task choices. In other words, our purpose is to go into the “black-box”
of the skill production function, identifying a precise and speciﬁc channel through which inher-
ited differences in self-conﬁdence can endogenously (i.e., through individual choices) explain
the emergence and persistence of gaps in the accumulation of human capital.
The working idea of our model is that by acting as role-models, parents transmit to their
children beliefs about their (unknown) ability. Such beliefs affect educational and task choices
and, through this channel, contribute to widen the gap in the accumulation of human capital
while the learning process (of acutal ability) takes place. The consequences of initially “wrong”
beliefs can thus have long lasting effects, even if agents eventually learn their true level of
ability.
An advantage of our approach is that the single non-cognitive skill we study has a clear
and simple economic interpretation, and that we make transparent the channel through which
it affects the accumulation of human capital (and thus, indirectly, earnings).
For self-conﬁdence to have important effects we do not need to assume that agents en-
joy holding a good image of themselves (i.e. that self-conﬁdence enters directly the utility
function), something that would imply that some degree of overconﬁdence is optimal2. Our
theoretical framework assumes full rationality, given that agents extract all the available in-
formation from the signals received in order to update their beliefs, and this implies that they
eventually learn their true type. Similarly, we exclude any other form of self-deception. The
Bayesian learning mechanism is based on observing success or failure in the endeavour under-
taken, given that the probability of success depends on the true level of ability as well as on the
difﬁculty of the task, which is chosen endogenously in accordance with (updated) beliefs about
one’s ability.
We ﬁnally simulate the model with a bootstrapping procedure, showing that choices dis-
torted by under-conﬁdence (while all the other sources of heterogeneity are neutralized) lead to
a signiﬁcant gap in the accumulation of human capital during the learning process of the true
level of ability. As long as it correlates with the family background, self-conﬁdence constitutes
therefore a channel through which gaps in educational attainments and earnings perpetuate
across generations.
This ﬁnding also helps to explain why the early gaps based on the socio-economic back-
ground do not narrow when the role of the family becomes less important during life, and it
suggests that policies aimed at providing early and accurate feedbacks on the cognitive skills
of disadvantaged children can be important in promoting inter-generational income mobility.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we survey the relevant literature com-
paring our theoretical approach with others in the literature. We also provide evidence sop-
porting both the important role played by self-conﬁdence and the correlation between self-
2Such an assumption is quite common in the behavioral economics literature (eg. in K¨ oszegi, 2006 and Wein-
berg, 2009). We discuss this issue in more details in section 2.3.
3conﬁdence and family background. In Section 3 we present a simple and parsimonious theoret-
ical model that highlights how self-conﬁdence can affect the accumulation of human capital via
task choice. In section 4 we present the results of a simple simulation in order to better assess
the implications of our model in terms of the emergenge of gaps in educational attainments
between people from different backgrounds. Section 5 comments upon our results and draws
some conclusions.
2 Motivation
In this section we survey the related theoretical and empirical literature to motivate the rele-
vance of our work. In subsection 2.1 we document how incorrect beliefs about ability are very
common, and how this fact can have important practical consequences. In subsection 2.2 we
discuss the different deﬁnitions and interpretations of conﬁdence that have been used in the
literature and why we have chosen to focus on a deﬁnition based on the levels of beliefs, rather
than on their precision. In subsection 2.3 we discuss an assumption commonly made in the lit-
erature, i.e. that people actually care about their beliefs, and explain why decided not to make
this assumption. Finally, in subsection 2.4 we justify one of the main assumption of our model
by providing evidence that suggests the existence of a relevant link between self-conﬁdence
and the socio-economic background.
2.1 Imperfect knowledge of one’s ability
Wedeﬁneself-conﬁdenceasthebeliefsanagentholdsabouthisownability, followingB´ enabou
and Tirole (2002), Hvide (2002), K¨ oszegi (2006), Sj¨ ogren and S¨ allstr¨ om (2004), and Weinberg
(2009), among the others. This derives from the assumption that ability is unknown to the
agent, instead of being his private information as in standard signaling models.
There is an extensive literature showing that agents hold a rough estimate of their cogni-
tive skills. For instance, Dunning, Heath, and Suls (2004) survey the psychological literature
documenting the presence of a weak correlation between actual and perceived performance in
several domains, while Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2006) provide experimental evidence that
people are substantially uncertain about their relative ability and that this have indeed important
consequences on search decisions.
Indirectevidencesupportingtheideathatindividualshaveimperfectknowledgeaboutone’s
own ability can be inferred by observing that people with similar observable characteristics
make different choices. In ﬁgure 1 we show that there is a considerable degree of overlapping
in the distribution of PISA 2006 test scores across people enrolled in different high-school
tracks (which are very likely to yield very different returns on the labor market)3.
3A similar ﬁgure appears in Checchi and Flabbi (2007).
4Figure 1: Netherlands (top), Italy (bottom)
Furthermore, comparing the top and the bottom panel (which refer respectively to the
Netherlands and to Italy) we see quite a different degree of overlapping in the two countries.
The main difference between the two educational systems is that while in Italy students and par-
ents are perfectly free to choose the high-school track4, in the Netherlands there is an aptitude
test5 administered at age 12 that, although not mandatory, has gained a considerable inﬂuence
in recommending the secondary track most suitable for the pupil. While we recognize that
there might be many other reasons to choose different tracks, the level of ability should also
play an important role. Figure 1 shows that the degree of overlapping across tracks, which
should in part be driven by ability mismatch, is much more pronounced in Italy where the un-
certainty about one’s ability is higher. There is also ample evidence (eg in Giuliano, 2008)
that the socio-economic background has a strong inﬂuence on the choice of high-school track.
These two stylized facts, examined toghether, suggests that systematic differences not related
to cognitive ability do inﬂuence educational choices.
Recent related literature has also investigated the role played by subjective returns to ed-
ucation in determining educational choices in developing countries. Jensen (2010) ﬁnds that,
4Although it is common to receive suggestions from school teachers.
5The so-called Cito test.
5in the Dominican Republic, perceived returns to secondary school are extremely low, despite
high measured returns, and that providing information about measured returns signiﬁcantly in-
creased enrollment rates; Nguyen (2008) ﬁnds instead that providing information on the returns
to schooling improves school performance in Madagascar. Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) and
Kaufmann (2010) show that, in Mexico, subjective earning expectations and risk perceptions
are important determinants of college attendance choices. However, they argue that,in that
particular context, an important determinant of differential enrollment rates between poor and
rich students is the presence of credit constraints. Imperfect information about ability (affected
by different levels of conﬁdence) is conceptually very similar to imperfect estimation of the
market returns to education (due to incomplete information or to differences in the information
set), and our model could easily be reinterpreted in this term. However, although being obser-
vationally equivalent, the two competing explanations can have very different consequences in
terms of policy prescriptions.
2.2 Level vs. precision of beliefs
Another important issue is the deﬁnition of conﬁdence in terms of the mean vs. the spread of
the distribution of beliefs6. The former implies that an overconﬁdent holds too high an estimate
of his ability. The latter refers to an evaluation that is too precise, and better ﬁts for instance an
investment decision about which an agent can underestimate the variance of the future return.
Conﬁdence in terms of precision of beliefs could be adapted to a framework in which one’s
ability is the random variable, although it would be meaningless to talk about overconﬁdence
as long as the true level of ability is a point estimate.
The two concepts, however, are not correlated, and their interaction can also determine
counterintuitive results. For instance, it may happen that an agent that is quite conﬁdent along
both dimensions could think to have a lower probability of success than another who is totally
agnostic about his ability. To avoid such a possibility we assume that the probability of success
is linear in ability, and we prefer to adopt a notion of conﬁdence that refers to the level instead
of the precision of beliefs. In our framework beliefs are deﬁned as a probability distribution
over the whole support of ability, so the second moment enters the picture but it can only affect
the speed of convergence.
The focus on the level rather than on the precision of beliefs is one of the main difference
between our model and the one proposed by Sj¨ ogren and S¨ allstr¨ om (2004) (who also describe
the endogenous evolution of self-conﬁdence for rational agents that choose tasks and update
their beliefs in a Bayesian fashion after observing the outcomes of their choices). A second
major difference is that, in our framework, agents eventually discover their true type, while
Sj¨ ogren and S¨ allstr¨ om (2004) show how people can remain “trapped” with wrong beliefs due
6Both deﬁnitions are used in the literature. The ﬁrst for instance by Hvide (2002), B´ enabou and Tirole (2002),
and Weinberg (2009), the second by Sj¨ ogren and S¨ allstr¨ om (2004), while K¨ oszegi (2006) and Belzil (2007) use
both.
6to insufﬁcient experimentation and learning7.
The probability of success that characterizes our model implies that our agents make deci-
sions under uncertainty; our work can thus be linked to the literature that sees education as a
risky investment and that investigates the role played by risk aversion. Belzil (2007) estimates
both the degree of over and under estimation of labor market skills and the dispersion of the
distribution of subjective beliefs. He ﬁnds evidence of frequent (but moderate) over-estimation
and cases of severe under-estimation (particularly among the most able individuals). He also
ﬁnds that only 25% of unobserved ability heterogeneity is perceived by the individuals as ex-
ante risk and that 36% of the population act on the basis of a degenerate subjective ability
distribution. Belzil and Leonardi (2007) ﬁnd that risk aversion can be a deterrent to investing in
education, but that differences in risk attitude account for a modest portion of the probability of
entering higher education. Since the effect of underconﬁdence can be confounded with that of
risk aversion, in order to isolate the role of conﬁdence we assume that agents are risk neutral.
2.3 Self-conﬁdence in the utility function
Thereisawealthofcontributionsinthepsychologicalliteratureshowingthatconﬁdenceaffects
the task choice (see Weinberg (2009) and literature therein). In this paper we also focus on the
rolethatconﬁdenceplaysthroughthischannel, andmorespeciﬁcallyonhowtaskchoiceshapes
human capital acquisition. In our model conﬁdence affects utility only indirectly through the
choice of task, which determines how much human capital the agent gets, and there is no direct
inﬂuence like there would be in case the agent enjoys thinking that his ability is high. Examples
of models in which beliefs about one’s ability enter directly the utility function are Weinberg
(2009) and K¨ oszegi (2006). While such models rationalize many interesting features of human
behaviour (along with the result that moderate levels of overconﬁdence turn out to be optimal),
we decide to stick to a simpler theoretical framework in which this does not happen. The main
reason is that once agents are supposed to enjoy holding a good self-image, they should also
be capable of tailoring the information acquisition during their learning process in such a way
to preserve it, for instance by means of beliefs that are “pragmatic” (Hvide, 2002) or more
generally self-serving, as well as with selective memory (B´ enabou and Tirole, 2002)8.
Manipulating the information acquisition can only be effective in the short run, unless
agents end up stuck in a self-conﬁrming equilibrium in which their learning process reaches
a ﬁxed point although their beliefs are wrong. In other words, beliefs are wrong but never
disconﬁrmed by the evidence either because further experimenation is not available or because
7To achieve this result, they have to assume that there are non-informative task, in which the probability of
succes is equal to one.
8B´ enabou and Tirole (2002) also assume that discount rates are lower at shorter horizons than at more distant
ones (time-inconsistency). Belzil (2007), however, ﬁnd a predominance of the future component of intertemporal
utility over the present component in schooling decision, and interpret it as evidence supportive of the standard
time-consistent model.
7agents continue to indeﬁnitely self-deceive themselves9. Although such an outcome cannot
be exclueded, we ﬁnd more interesting to analyze the effect of holding a wrong self-image
when the true type is eventually learned. Including beliefs in the utility function would only
incentivate some form of self-deception that, even allowing the manipulation of information
acquisition, would only have the transitory effect of slowing down the learning process, and
therefore we prefer to avoid such a complication. Our model thus adheres to a perfectly rational
framework, with agents characterized by standard preferences and that unbiasedly exploit the
whole information available.
2.4 The inter-generational transmission of conﬁdence
Recent empirical ﬁndings provide support for one of the key assumptions of our model, namely
that self-conﬁdence is correlated with the family background. Cesarini, Johannesson, Lichten-
stein, andWallace(2009), usingSwedishdataonasampleoftwinsanddeﬁningoverconﬁdence
as the difference between the perceived and actual rank in cognitive ability, argue that genetic
differences explain 16-34% of the variation in overconﬁdence, and that common environmen-
tal differences explain an additional 5-11%. A series of studies on different longitudinal UK
datasets (collected in Goodman and Gregg, 2010) ﬁnd a strong intergenerational correlation
not only in cognitive skills, but also in a variety of attitudes that can be considered proxies
of conﬁdence. In particular, Gregg and Washbrook (2011) ﬁnd that, even after controlling for
long-run family background factors and prior attainment, children are more likely to perform
well in tests at age 11 if they have strong beliefs in their own ability and have a more internal
locus of control10, and they also ﬁnd that children from poorer families are less likely to have
these attributes. Chowdry, Crawford, and Goodman (2011) ﬁnd that richer parents have higher
expectationsoftheirchildren’seducationalattainmentsandthatyoungpeoplefrompoorerfam-
ilies have lower ability beliefs, a more external locus of control and lower educational aspira-
tions and expectations. After controlling for attainment at age 11, 15% of the socio-economic
gap in attainment at age 16 is accounted for by child attitudes, and an additional 12% is ac-
counted for by parental attitudes. Chevalier, Gibbons, Thorpe, Snell, and Hoskins (2009) ﬁnd
that working class undergraduates underestimate their performance relative to others, but also
that working class secondary school pupils have greater conﬁdence and a more positive self-
evaluation of their math ability. This ﬁnding may be due to differences in peer-groups and to
the “big ﬁsh, small pond effect”. Here we provide additional evidence about the link between
socio-economic background and self-conﬁdence using data from the OECD-PISA study. This
dataset contains what we believe is a good proxy for self-conﬁdence, namely “Science Self-
9Models in K¨ oszegi (2006) and Weinberg (2009) are characterized by a small number of periods. Hvide (2002)
justiﬁes pragmatic beliefs in the long run with a thought experiment in which “the agent takes into account what
pays rather than what is true.”
10People with an external locus of control tend to think that luck or fate, rather than their own actions, are what
matters in life. It is likely that this is related to low levels of conﬁdence in own ability.
8Efﬁcacy”, an index built from student’s answers to questions about the ease with which they
believe they could perform eight science-related tasks. This variable is a good proxy for beliefs
about academic ability because it is meant to go “beyond how good students think they are in
subjects such as science. It is more concerned with the kind of conﬁdence that is needed for
them to successfully master speciﬁc learning tasks, and is therefore not simply a reﬂection of a
student’s abilities and performance” (OECD, 2009)11.
We thus regress our measure of conﬁdence on family background, adding controls at the
individual, school and family level; results are presented in Table 1.
The relationship between Self-efﬁcacy and family background is signiﬁcant and positive as
expected, displaying a convex correlation. In the second column we also control for the score
obtained by the student in the Science section of the test. This is a proxy for “true” ability,
comparable across students in different countries and unobserved by the student at the time of
ﬁllinginthequestionnaire. TheinclusionofPISAscorecapturessomevarianceofself-efﬁcacy,
but the positive relationship with family background remains strong. Notice that controlling for
the PISA score is likely to bias downward the role played by self-conﬁdence, because if our
model is correct the PISA score already encompasses the gap in the human capital accumulated
up to that point also because of a different self-conﬁdence. In other words, two students with
the same innate ability but characterized by a different self-conﬁdence should also display a
different PISA score.
Adding further controls at the student level (column 3) and at the parent and school level
(column 4) does not change signiﬁcantly the results, which we interpret as suggestive evidence
thatfamilybackgroundhasadirectimpactonself-conﬁdence, overandabovetheoneoperating
through the transmission of cognitive skills.
ThePISAdatasethastheadvantageofbeingalarge-scale, international, representativesam-
ple, but includes extremely heterogeneous students at an early stage of their education career.
Therefore, we replicate a similar analysis using another dataset with opposite characteristics,
coming from a survey of a much more homogeneous population at later stage of their academic
career. This dataset has been collected by circulating a questionnaire to all second year Boc-
coni students in 2001, subsequently merged with administrative data. It contains information
about students’ expectations on occupation and wages 1 and 10 years after graduation, about
their family background, as well as detailed information on their academic career12. We use
expected wage as a proxy for self-conﬁdence, while family-background is proxied by parents’
educational levels and the students’ tuition category (a function of family income). Wage ex-
pectations 10 year after graduation are probably the best measure of self-conﬁdence, since after
11See Ferla, Valcke, and Cai (2009) for a discussion on the differences between Self-Efﬁcacy and Self-Concept.
Since Self-Efﬁcacy solicits goal-referenced evaluation and does not ask students to compare their ability to that of
others, we believe it is a better proxy for the notion of conﬁdence that we use in the model of Section 3.
12The same data are used in Filippin and Ichino (2005), to which we refer for further details on the characteris-
tics of the dataset.
9Table 1: Results: Science Self-Efﬁcacy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Pisa score Effort Parents
Index of socio-ec. status 0.318*** 0.145*** 0.111*** 0.119***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.026]
Index of socio-ec. status2 0.033*** 0.022* 0.030** 0.026
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.014]
Female -0.157*** -0.141*** -0.157*** -0.031
[0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.017]
PISA score in Science 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Out of school - Science 0.112***
[0.009]
Self study - Science 0.114***
[0.006]
Interest in learning science 0.226***
[0.012]
Personal value of science 0.222***
[0.013]
Parents’ value of science 0.001
[0.013]
Science career motivation -0.029**
[0.009]
Science activities at age 10 0.062***
[0.008]
School-level characteristics NO NO NO YES
R2 0.119 0.230 0.255 0.355
Observations 225,098 225,098 216,304 29,970
BRR standard errors in brackets. p < 0:1,p < 0:05,p < 0:01.
All regressions include country dummies and control for immigrant status, tracking
and the interaction between tracking and the socio-economic status. In column 4 we
also control for school-level variables like school size, student-teacher ratio, ability
sorting and a dummy for public schools.
10such a spell of time wages should be expected to reﬂect productivity more precisely13. Notice
that also in this case the proxies for ability are likely to bias downward the role played by
self-conﬁdence, since they also control for the gap in the human capital accumulated up to that
point. Table 2 reports results from regressing the log of expected wage ten years after gradua-
tion on family background variables and individual controls. While parental education does not
seem to have a signiﬁcant impact on expected wages, the effect of family income (proxied by
tuition category) is signiﬁcant and J-shaped, with a minimum in the third category14. Results
are almost unchanged when both measures of family background are included.
Table 2: Expected Wage 10 Years After Graduation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parental Ed. Income Income squared Full
Parent graduate 0.056 0.030
[0.030] [0.031]
Parent primary ed. 0.001 -0.006
[0.057] [0.057]
Income bracket 0.030*** -0.138** -0.142***
[0.009] [0.042] [0.043]
Income bracket2 0.022*** 0.023***
[0.005] [0.005]
Female -0.085** -0.094** -0.094*** -0.091**
[0.029] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028]
Family ﬁrm 0.212*** 0.174** 0.164** 0.165**
[0.057] [0.058] [0.057] [0.057]
Average grade 0.022** 0.021** 0.019* 0.019*
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
High School grade -0.395* -0.342 -0.316 -0.319
[0.199] [0.198] [0.197] [0.197]
R2 0.117 0.127 0.146 0.147
Observations 764 764 764 764
Standard errors in brackets. p < 0:1,p < 0:05,p < 0:01.
All regressions include dummies for degree program, type of high school, region of
residence and expected sector of employment.
13For the sake of brevity we only report results using expected wages 10 years after graduation. Results using
short-term expectations are not signiﬁcantly different, and are available upon request.
14At that time, there were 6 brackets, and more than 60% of the students in our sample were in the top three
categories (with 35% of students in the top bracket). Our results imply that students in the lowest income category
are more conﬁdent than those from the middle class (third income bracket). A possible explanation is that Bocconi
is a very expensive university where rich families are over-represented. Students from poor families are instead
under-represented because they could not afford the tuition fees without ﬁnancial help, which is awarded only if
strict requirements in terms of academic performance are fulﬁlled. Therefore, the subsample of students in lower
income brackets is likely to suffer a stronger self-selection problem because only particularly good and strongly
motivated students are able to enroll.
11Bocconi is recognized as an elite university in Italy, widely known to attract very good
students and well recognized in the labour market. Hence, one should expect that the signal
provided by graduating at Bocconi is strong enough to more than counterbalance the effect of
any other difference in students’ former endowments. In contrast, we ﬁnd that the different
socio-economic background still shapes wage expectations. Hence, the same observed (and
observable) signals have a different impact on different people. Our interpretations is that in-
herited beliefs about one’s own ability survive a string of commonly-believed-to-be very good
signals. Unfortunately, we cannot attribute a causal interpretation to this result, because such
a correlation could be a spurious spillover of different networking abilities or different pref-
erences correlated to the family background. However, the same correlation appears in the
wage realizations of a similar but richer survey of Bocconi graduates in which a larger set of
controls is available15. Moreover, our results are similar to what has been recently found by De-
laney, Harmon, and Redmond (2011), who use a dataset collected from seven Irish universities
(and thus certainly more representative of the population of Irish undergraduate students), and
that also include many different measures of non-cognitive skills such as risk attitudes, time
preferences and personality traits.
3 The Model
In this section we present in more details a multi-period model based on the assumptions al-
ready discussed in sections 2.1-2.4, in which agents choose a task on the basis of their beliefs,
which are updated in a Bayesian manner after observing the outcome of every choice. Our
purpose is to highlight the role played by conﬁdence in explaining educational attainments via
task choice.
As already explained, we assume that children do not know their own ability a and hold
a belief represented by the density function (a). We deﬁne conﬁdence the perceived ability
^ (a) =
R
a(a)da and underconﬁdent a student who underestimates her ability: ^ (a) < a:
Similarly, the overconﬁdent is characterized by ^ (a) > a: Students make educational choices
by choosing “tracks” ( ). We think of tracks as a rather general concept, encompassing either
“real” school tracks (eg. academic vs. vocational high schools) or any goal that the student
sets herself. In the latter sense a track could well be interpreted as the amount of knowledge
encompassed in a concept. More difﬁcult tracks in both interpretations are more costly in terms
of effort, but they also yield higher payoffs in case of success. A failure could be interpreted
either as a true failure in a real track (eg. the student drops out or must repeat a grade) or as the
chance that, in trying to deeply understand some difﬁcult material, the student wastes energy
and time, ending up learning less than she would have done had she been less ambitious.
We assume that the probability of success is given by
15Results are not displayed to save space but they are available upon request.
12p(s) = f (a; ) (1)
where   represents how difﬁcult is the track chosen. The probability of success is assumed
to be increasing in ability (f0 (a) > 0) and decreasing in the difﬁculty of the track (f0 ( ) < 0).
Students have then the possibility of updating their beliefs using Bayes’ rule, when addi-
tional information can be derived from the outcome of their choice. Given a generic density of






Successful outcome (s) in the track chosen allows agents to add human capital k ( js)
to working life productivity, and agents maximize their instantaneous utility by choosing the
track that optimally balances their expected acquisition of human capital with a convex cost of
acquiring it U [p(s)k ( )    2], given their conﬁdence about unobserved ability.
If the track chosen is totally uninformative (e.g. p(s) = 1) the student does not gather
evidence that contradicts his/her wrong beliefs. For instance, this may happen when there is a
discrete set of tracks and the less able students self-select into the easiest track characterized
by no probability of failure. This is admittedly a limit situation, and therefore we prefer to
concentrate on what happens to the gap in the accumulation of human capital when agents do
learn from observed outcomes and proceed with Bayesian updating of their beliefs until their
conﬁdence eventually converges towards the true value of ability.
To achieve this goal we make some simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the
probability of success is linear in ability. The reason is that, as anticipated in section 2.2, we
concentrate on the role played by the level of one’s perceived ability, and not by the precision
of such belief. This is a major difference for instance with respect to the model in Sj¨ ogren
and S¨ allstr¨ om (2004), who assume that the probability of succesfully acquiring skills of type
c1 is p(s) = ac1, where a 2 [0;1] is the agent’s unknown ability, while c1 > 1 measures the
ability elasticity of success. In such a framework the precision of the signal is crucial, because
uncertainty about ability makes riskier options more or less attractive depending on whether
the probability of success is convex or concave in ability. For instance, what could happen
with a convex probability of success is that a totally uncertain agent could think to have more
chances of succeeding than an agent characterized by quite a precise belief of being above the
average. In contrast, we choose to remove such discontinuities by assuming linearity in ability
in equation (1) and to focus on the effect of the level of conﬁdence16. Hence, we assume the
following functional form of the probability of success:
16Note that in order to neutralize the effect of the precision of beliefs it is not enough to assume the same
variance of prior beliefs, because at different level of conﬁdence the impact of the variance would be different as
long as the probability of success is not linear in ability.
13p(s) =  a + (1    ): (3)
This speciﬁcation implies that the importance of ability is proportional to the difﬁculty of
the track. Notice that for the probability of success to be properly deﬁned we need ability to
have a ﬁnite support, and for the sake of simplicity we assume both a 2 [0;1] and   2 (0;1].
The extreme value   = 0 would correspond to the uninformative case mentioned above in
which ability does not matter and the signal is totally uninformative (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Different tracks in terms of importance of ability
We also assume that more difﬁcult tracks allow students to acquire more human capital if





where m = (a   ^ a) represents the ability mismatch. ^ a represents the optimal level of ability
for that track, i.e. the level of ability that characterizes the student that maximizes her utility
by choosing exactly that track. We assume that f(0) = 0, i.e. that human capital concides
with the difﬁculty of the track when ability perfectly ﬁts, otherwise   is corrected, with the
shape of f(m) when m 6= 0 crucially affecting the results. In particular, we assume that
f0(jmj)  0 meaning that neither under- nor overconﬁdence can increase human capital beyond
 . This assumption might appear counterintuitive at ﬁrst glance, but it has the great advantage
14of preventing self-deception. Consider the case in which in the same track the human capital
is lower only for the overconﬁdent successful students, because their ability is lower than what
optimal for such a track, while the opposite happens for the underconﬁdent successful students.
Inthiscase, thepossibilityofsupplmentingthehumancapitalprovidedbythechosentrackwith
an ability higher than ^ a implies that there is room for self-deception, i.e. that systematically
underestimating one’s ability might become an optimal solution, with a consequent bias in the
choice of the track that we want to avoid for the same reasons outlined in section 2.3. Of course,
the effect of the mistake in evaluating ability does not need to be symmetric. In the simulation
below we will assume that underconﬁdence has no effect (f(m) = 0 when m < 0), while
overconﬁdence has a negative impact (f0(m) > 0 when m > 0). To complete the picture, we
assume that a failure leaves the stock of human capital unchanged, i.e. k ( ;(a);ajf) = 017.
Students are free to self-select into different tracks given the best estimate of their ability,
trading off a lower human capital in case of success with a higher probability of acquiring it. If






2   ^ a
(5)
Given that f(m) implies to truthfully self-report one’s unknown ability, i.e. to set the mis-
take (a)   a = 0, the optimal choice of track becomes an increasing function of conﬁdence.
However, evenremovinganybiasintheself-evaluationofability, (a)and ^ amaystilldifferdue
to insufﬁcient information. Equation 5 therefore implies that both under- and over-conﬁdence
determine a suboptimal track choice and a loss of utility due to the mismatch (a) 6= ^ a.
The effect of under- and over-conﬁdence can differ as far as the accumulation of human
capital is concerned. Rewriting conﬁdence as the composition of optimal ability and the evalu-




^ a + 2m   3
(^ a + m   2)2(1 + f(m))
: (6)
The relationship between conﬁdence and human capital can be summarized by means of the











(^ a + 2m   3)f0(m)
(^ a + m   2)2(1 + f(m))2: (7)
17This assumption is made without loss of generality as compared to the case in which the human capital
accumulated in case of failure is positive but strictly lower: k( ;(a);ajs) > k( ;(a);ajf).
18To analyze the role played by self-conﬁdence in shaping the gap in educational attainments when agents are
eventually learning their true level of ability we need to iterate this choice for several periods. In principle, we
should compute the optimal track choice by maximizing a lifetime utility function. Since additional information
about one’s ability is valuable per se as long as it helps making better choices in the future, agents could be willing
to pay a price to receive a more informative signal, by choosing a track slightly different than what would be
optimal in a static framework. However, such an effect is of a second order magnitude and it does not determine
appreciable changes in the results (see footnote 24 below), thereby not justifying the corresponding increase in
the complication of the model. Hence, we assume that agents are myopic and that they maximize their expected
utility period by period.
15As long as a small ability mismatch has a negligible impact, i.e. as long as f0(0) is suf-
ﬁciently small, the derivative is positive around m = 0 for every value of a 2 [0;1]. This
means that a small degree of overconﬁdence (m > 0) increases the amount of expected hu-
man capital, although at a price of lower utility because the increase of human capital would
be acquired overestimating the expected return on the additional effort19. As overconﬁdence
increases, the sign of E(k)=m depends on the magnitude of the effect of the mismatch. In
the limit case in which there is no effect, e.g. when f(m) = 0 in Equation 4, or in any case
when such an effect is negligible, the human capital acquired would monotonically increase
with overconﬁdence since the positive effect of the higher human capital acquired when suc-
cessful dominates the negative effect of a lower chance that this event happens. In contrast,
if the effect of overevaluating one’s ability increases substantially with the size of the mistake
(e.g. if f(m) = m2) the relation between expected human capital and overconﬁdence becomes
bow-shaped. As far as underconﬁdence is concerned, the condition that ensures that there is no
incentivetoself-deceptionisalsosufﬁcienttograntthathumancapitaldecreasesmonotonically
as underconﬁdence increases.
Agents update their beliefs given the signal received (success or failure) at the end of each
period20. In order to characterize the learning process and to investigate the effect of self-
conﬁdence on educational attainments we need to specify how beliefs about one’s ability are
shaped. The Beta distribution perfectly ﬁts our assumption of a ﬁnite support of the ability
distribution, necessary to ensure that the probability of success is linear in ability. At the same
time the Beta distribution is sufﬁciently general to allow prior beliefs to represent different
levels of conﬁdence while keeping the whole domain of ability in their support, something nec-
essary because with a Bayesian learning process agents can never assign a positive probability
to events excluded by the prior.




0 a 1(1   a) 1da
; (8)
while the mean is given by:
19The reason is that the probability of success depends on the true level of ability, and overconﬁdence would
grant a higher level of human capital when successful, but a positive outcome is less likely to happen than what
an overconﬁdent agent expects.
20Note that was the agent receiving a perfectly informative signal like the exact amount of human capital
acquired when successful he could invert k( ;(a);ajs) deriving with certainty her true ability level. However,
data suggest that uncertainty about ability survives many signals, which therefore are not perfectly informative (or
eveniftheyareperfectlyinformativeagentscannotfullyexploitthem). Inwhatfollowsweassumethatagentsonly
observe the event success vs. failure. In other words, agents know only the potential amount of human capital  
but not the actual amount once corrected for the mismatch of ability 1+f(m). An intermediate situation in which
additional information can be extracted from a noisy signal of the level of human capital actually acquired (in
other words when different degrees of success are observable) could be formalized at the price of a signiﬁcantly
increased complication of the model without appreciable additional insights. Hence, we prefer to stick to the








When  =  > 1 the distribution is symmetric and bell-shaped. The distribution is skewed
to the left when  >  > 1, and to the right when  >  > 121. The higher  and , the lower
the variance and therefore the more precise the beliefs. We assume that ability is distributed in
the population following a Beta[2:5;2:5], and that the same distribution also characterizes the
beliefs of the median student. This is equivalent to assume that the median student (a = 0:5)
holds correct beliefs about his/her ability, because when (a)  Beta[2:5;2:5] conﬁdence is
^ (a) = 0:5.
Before analyzing the effect of over- and underconﬁdence let us focus on the median student
in order to describe in some details the learning process. After observing the outcome, the
agent updates her beliefs using Bayes rule. In particular, her posterior beliefs after observing a
success are:
(ajs) =
( a + 1    )(a)
R 1
0 ( a + 1    )(a)da
(10)
By contrast, if a failure was observed:
^ (ajf) =
(     a)(a)
R 1
0 (     a)(a)da
(11)
Figure 3: Beliefs updating of the median student after the ﬁrst signal
21The Uniform is a special case of the Beta distribution when both parameters are equal to 1.
17The mass of probability is reallocated according to the realization of the signal, towards the
upper bound if successful (see Figure 3, right curve) and toward the lower bound if not (see
Figure 3, left curve), keeping contstant the support of the density. Notice that the bad event has
a stronger effect when updating beliefs22.
The agent will then choose again the optimal track given posterior beliefs, that will be
further revised after observing the outcome in the second period, and so on and so forth. The
bottom line is that, within the support of initial beliefs, the distribution of beliefs changes
according to the history of signals observed. Subsequent updates bring beliefs closer and closer
to the true ability level as long as the agent continues receiving informative signals.
4 Simulation
To analyze the effect of self-conﬁdence we analyze the choices made and the human capital
accumulated by an agent whose ability is always a = 0:5 when she holds correct prior beliefs
on average (a)  Beta[2:5;2:5], and comparing them with the counterfactuals in which
she is underconﬁdent and overconﬁdent, respectively. In other words, we simulate the model
picking up the median student and looking at the effect in her educational attainments of a
wrong conﬁdence in both directions. In fact, the higher human capital accumulated when the
student is not too overconﬁdent, i.e. when the mismatch effect does not prevail, and successful
can be compensated by a probability of achieving it that is lower for two reasons. First, because
the track is more difﬁcult and therefore the same person is more likely to fail. Second, because
the true ability is lower than conﬁdence. In the utility maximization only the former is correctly
internalized, and the student will therefore be successful less often than she expects. This is the
engine that eventually drives her conﬁdence towards the true level of ability.
We represent underconﬁdence with a distribution of prior beliefs
(a)  Beta[1:5;3] (12)
skewed to the right. This implies a level of conﬁdence ^ (a) = 1=3, corresponding to the
24th percentile in the true distribution.
Similarly, overconﬁdence is summarized by a distribution of prior beliefs
(a)  Beta[3;1:5] (13)
skewed to the left, which implies a level of conﬁdence ^ (a) = 2=3, corresponding to the
22The reason is that a failure is far less likely given the speciﬁcation of the model. In fact, the student with
correct prior beliefs will revise her conﬁdence upward a fraction 1   0:5  of the times, while she will revise her
conﬁdence downward in the other 0:5  times. While her expected posterior conﬁdence is always unchanged at
0.5, the upward and downward revisions would be symmetric only when   = 1, i.e. when the two events are
equally likely.
1877th percentile in the true distribution. These parameters also imply that the three distributions
have roughly the same variance, and therefore that over- and underconﬁdence are perfectly
symmetric23. Prior beliefs of the three different types of student are summarized in Figure 4.
As far as the ability mismatch described in Equation 4 is concerned, we choose no correction
in case of underconﬁdence (f(m) = 0 if m < 0) and a quadratic term f(m) = 3m2 if m > 0
that implies a discount of about 7.5% in the human capital acquired in the ﬁrst period by the
overconﬁdent student if successful.
Figure 4: Prior beliefs given the different levels of conﬁdence
We analize what happens to the human capital accumulated by the three types while the
learning process takes place, iterating the updating of beliefs 45 times. Since the single re-
alization of human capital relies upon a random component, we replicate the procedure 200
times.
The value of conﬁdence slowly converges towards the true ability level for those starting
with a wrong prior, but the learning process is far from being completed. In fact, at the end of
the 45th iteration conﬁdence is about :425 for the underconﬁdent and :558 for the overconﬁdent,
in both cases signiﬁcantly different than :5 (jpj < 0:001)24.
23Although the probability of success does not depend on the variance of beliefs, the latter could still affect
the updating process, since the more precise the beliefs, the lower the change of conﬁdence induced by the same
signal received. We do not want the learning pattern to be affected by a different precision of beliefs, and therefore
we assume the same variance in the prior distributions.
24 The speed of convergence of the two types differs a little bit. In fact, the mistake in conﬁdence becomes
signiﬁcantly smaller for the over conﬁdent (jpj = 0:038). The reason is that the higher the track chosen, the more
balanced the probability of success given the same true level of ability a = 0:5, the more informative the signal.
At ﬁrst glance this seems to imply that the choice of track and the educational outcomes could have been different
had we internalized the different informativeness of the signals by means of dynamic optimiziation. In fact, there
19Figure 5 displays the average gap, period by period, across repetitions, in the accumulation
of human capital of the types who start with wrong priors as compared to the student start-
ing with correct beliefs. The human capital accumulated by the underconﬁdent is signiﬁcantly
lower than the human capital acquired by the student holding correct beliefs (jpj < 0:001),
while the opposite happens for the overconﬁdent type (jpj < 0:001), though the magnitude is
different in absolute terms because of the cost of the mismatch f(m). Notice that at the begin-
ning, when the overconﬁdence is larger (and therefore also the cost of mismatching), the human
capital accumulated is not much higher, while it increases as compared to the student with cor-
rect beliefs, as long as conﬁdence converges towards the true type and the cost of mismatch
decreases. Given the chosen speciﬁcation of the model, the gap between the overconﬁdent and
the underconﬁdent turns out to be about 6%.
Figure 5: Gap in the accumulation of human capital
To summarize, self-conﬁdence can determine signiﬁcant differences in the outcomes ob-
served. When the learning process reaches the ﬁxed point implied by discovering the true level
of ability, the three types in the simulation will start making the same choices and from that
seems to be an additional incentive to choose a higher track thereby reducing the effect of underconﬁdence while
increasing that of overconﬁdence. This is not the case, however, because such an argument holds only when the
probability of success is computed holding constant the true value of ability. When choosing  , in contrast, agents
use the best estimate of their ability (a). Notice that the perceived probability of success is increasing in (a).
Hence, internalizing the different informativeness of the signal would imply a lower revision of the optimal choice
at low levels of ability. In any case, maximizing utility period by period implies choices that marginally differ in
terms of magnitude, and therefore a negligible mistake, particularly at low levels of ability.
20moment onwards they will be observationally equivalent. However, the level of human capital
acquired is and will remain signiﬁcantly different. Wrong beliefs about one’s ability do not
need to be self-conﬁrming to explain unequal outcomes if they lead to signiﬁcantly different
choices during the learning process. As long as the family background shapes children’s beliefs
about their ability, conﬁdence can be a transmission mechanism that increases the intergenera-
tional persistence of outcomes.
Notice that in the model the probability of success increases with innate ability only, while
the human capital accumulated plays no role. As already noticed in Section 2.4, this simplify-
ing assumption downplays the role of nurture, since achievements are also determined by the
whole history of intermediate outcomes, in turn also driven by self-conﬁdence, as well as by
the environment in which the children grow. Therefore, what found by the model is once more
a lower bound of the role of self-conﬁdence, since the cumulative effect of the gap in the human
capital accumulated during the learning process of one’s ability is not taken into account. The
role of nurture therefore implies that tests meant to measure students’ ability are instead cap-
turing also the gap in human capital accumulated up to that point because of a different family
background. For instance, a centralized test administered at age 15 in order to select students
into different tracks would probably classify as different two students characterized by the same
innate ability but with a different background, thereby helping to perpetuate intergenerational
inequalities. A policy implication arising from the model is therefore that cognitive tests should
take place as early as possible in order to endow parents with measures of the innate level of
ability of the children that are not confounded with the role that the family background can play
through self-conﬁdence among the several ways.
5 Conclusions
In line with some recent contributions, we claim that the socio-economic background affects
not only the actual stock of cognitive skills possessed by a child (innate ability) but also the
beliefs about such (unobserved) cognitive skills. There is indeed a vast literature supporting
the hypothesis that people have imperfect knowledge of their ability and that many personality
traits related to the concept of self-conﬁdence are inﬂuenced by the family background in which
a child grows up.
We provide further suggestive evidence about the link between conﬁdence and family back-
ground using two very different sources: the PISA datasets, which is a representative cross-
national survey of 15-year old pupils, and a very homogeneous dataset of students from Boc-
coni University surveyed at a later stage of their career. We show that in both samples the link
between conﬁdence and background is strong, and survives the inclusion of good controls of
unobserved and observed ability. Our proxies of ability are likely to bias downward the esti-
mated link between conﬁdence and background, since they capture not only innate ability but
also the gap in human capital that has been accumulated up to that point.
21We then propose a model in which fully rational agents, who maximize the expected acqui-
sition of human capital, choose tasks according to their perceived ability. True ability and the
difﬁculty of the chosen track affect the probability of success. After observing whether they
succeed or not, students update their beliefs, fully exploiting the available information, fol-
lowing Bayes’ rule. We simulate the model with a bootstrapping procedure and we show that
choices distorted by over- and under-conﬁdence lead to a signiﬁcant gap in the accumulation
of human capital during the process in which agents eventually learn their true level of ability.
In our model agents do not derive additional utility by holding a good self-image; the con-
sequence of this assumption is that if a perfectly informed and benevolent planner could force
individuals to choose the “right” task, the effect of wrong conﬁdence would disappear. Nev-
ertheless, even in a setting in which agents are fully rational and have standard preferences,
a moderate degree of over-conﬁdence can be beneﬁcial in terms of the accumulation of hu-
man capital over the life course, although at a price of a lower utility (since overconﬁdent and
underconﬁdent agents do not make, by construction, utility-maximizing choices). Underconﬁ-
dence, on the other hand, is suboptimal in terms of both utility maximization and human capital
accumulation.
The intergenerational transmission of beliefs can thus constitute a further channel through
which socio-economic differences perpetuate from one generation to the other because, even if
two individuals had the same innate cognitive ability, differences in beliefs would lead them to
make different choices in terms of investment in education. The results of our analysis suggest
that policy interventions aimed at providing early and precise feedbacks about the cognitve
skills of children from disadvantaged backgrounds can be beneﬁcial in helping to narrow the
gapsineducationalattainments, byavoidingthatequallytalentedpeoplemakedifferentchoices
only because they have inherited different beliefs about their potential.
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